gover-nment-owned wheat, Other research is used to compar-e the cost of i-educing wheat stocks via tine EEP with the cost of sinnply destroying the wheat, Although this paper focuses on wheat, clnnefly because wheat has accounted for the bulk of EEP activity, the economic pm'inciples used hem-c camn be generalized to similar' progr-ams for' other-
Group, have offen-ed alter-native proposals! The primary reason for-changing the current agricultural policies that benefit domestic fan-met-s at the expense of consumers, taxpayers and others is the cost of such programs. For example, the ministen's of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development n'ecentiy stated:
The cost of agricultur-al policies is consider-able, for governrnnent budgets, for consumer's and for the econonny as a whole, Moreover, excessive suppor-t policies entail an increasing disrortion of connpetition on won-Id mnar-kets; run counter' to the pt-mcipie of comparative advantage which is at tine r-oot of international tr-ade; and severely damage tIne situation of many developing countries.' This paper examines EEP's role in encouraging successftnl negotiations to hiber'ahize agricultur'al trade in the GAiT process.
Before examining the issues of export expansion and trade negotiations, we describe the expon-t subsidy programs of the United States and European Community and, in the process. pr-ovide historical background necessary to understand the EEP's objectives.
THE FARM POLICY ENVIRO.N.ME.NT UNDERLYING TIlE EXPORT

E'NHA.NCEMENT PROGHA%'I
The stage for-tlnis export subsidy progr'am was set by steady losses in the shar-e of wor'ld agricultural trade held by the United States and by parallel EC gains in export shares, Fronn 1977 to 1985, the U.S. sinare of the world's net wheat exports declined fiom 41,9 percent to 28.8 per-cent, while the EC's share rose fr-om -1.6 percent to 15.1 per--cent.b These cinanging mar-ket shares can be linked to EC export subsidies. Chart T shows that tine U.S. wheat export price gener-ahiy exceeded the subsidized EC expont price betweern 1978 annd T987. ' Since 1983, the gap has tended to widen. EC cxport subsidies are respomnsible for this gap because inter-nal EC prices are far above U.S. mnar'ket prices. This EC subsidy is the catalyst for the U.S. export subsidy program, which is targeted at those countries where EC-subsidized expor-ts have displaced U.S. exports.
Surplus Production and Govci-nnicnt ITheu.t Stocks
To under-stamnd the EEP goal of expori exparnsion, one must examine the U.S. farnn pr-ogn-ams used to support the production of most cr'ops. The nnost important consequence of these progr-anns is that they gener-ate sur-pluses because pr-ice guar-antees, with the exception of the early 1970s, have been above market-cleaning levels.
There are two main instruments of the cr-op pn-ograms: loan rates and target prices. Both ar-c price guarantees that ar-c announced well before farmers make planting decisions. To par-ticipate irn these programs, far-mer-s gener-allv have beern required to reduce crop acm-cage. For exannple, wineat farmer-s must set aside 10 per-cent of their-1989 wheat acreage base to quahil\' for the wheat price support program.
The loan rate, set at $2.06 per bushel for-the 1989 wlneat crop, serves as a price floor-. If the market pr-ice is lower than $2.06, a farmer-pledges the wheat crop to the gover-nment as cohlateral in exchange for-a "loan" of $2.06 per lnusheh. tf the price of wheat rises above the loan r-ate, the far-nner can r-epay the loan with interest, recover the crop and sell at the higher nnarket price. If the market price does not recover-, the farnner defaults on the "loan," thus ceding the cr-op to tine gover'nnnent. By law, the governnnent keeps the acquired surpluses oif the mnan-ket until the pr-ice reaches a higher level, known as the release ptice, at which time the surpluses can be sold on tine mar'ket.
While the loan rate acts as an explicit price support, tine target price functions as an explicit income support device and is the final pr-ice that fat-mer's receive for their crop. At the emnd of a crop year, far'nners receive "deficiency paymemits" equal to the differ-ence between the target price arnd either-the market pt-ice or-the loan nate, depending 4 See Rossmiller (1988) for an outline of the major features of the proposals by the United States, the European Community, the Cairns Group, Japan and Canada. The Cairns Group consists of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, Columbia, Hungary and Chile, 'See Wilson (1988) , p.S.
EC was a net importer of wheat in that year. EC data have been calculated for the EC-12 and exclude intra-EC trade. 'These data are not adjusted for wheat quality and transportation differentials. Such differentials, however, are relatively constant and, therefore, do not distort significantly the rising price gap trend, As suggested above, as tIne market pt-ice declirnes n-dative to the barn rate, farrnnerss firnd it rnnor-e profitable to sur-r'etncher their-crops to lIne gover-nrnnern for tine loatn n'ate pr-ice r-atlner' tinamn sell on the tnnarket. Tinese surplus stocks are accurnnulated 1w the Corirnnodity Cr-edit Corporatiomn, the age.rncv of tine U.S. Departrnnernt ofArgicuiture )tJSlJA) charged witin tine adnnitnistration of tine price support progm-antis. Cinart 2 shows tine inverse rehatiornslnip hetweern tine ac.cunnulatiotn of wheat stocks arnd tine pt-ice gap rnneasur-ed 1w tine nnanket pr-ice nnnirnus tine loam rate. Whnen tIne price gap imncr'eases because of cr-op slnor'tages or stt-orng dennand sucin as irn tine ear-lv 1970s, stocks ar-c n-educed. %'Vbnern tine pnce gap tnar'r-ows, and especially if tIne gap is rnegative, tine accurnnulatiorn of stocks occurs. The Iarge itncn'ease ir'n wlneat stocks in tine 1980s reflects tIne relatively snnall price gap.
ihsposing of Got'ernincnt iI"heat Stocks
Various progt'ams ar-c used to dispose of tine stocks tlnat at'e owrned 1w tine govet-rnrnnemnt. Some of tIne sur-plirs disposal is directed to the dornnestic nnnarket, but rnnost is directed to foreigrn nnarkets 'In some years, farmers have received a portion of this payment, an "advance deficiency payment," at the beginning of the crop year. Tinis allows them to sell U.S. commodities at prices tinat ar-c below U.S. nnatket pn-ices in or-der to be connpetitive with other export-subsidizing countries. An EEP.~aiesinitiative states the tar'geted country and the quantity of a specific connmodity to be sold. Krno~ingtinat a subsidy is available, private U.S. exporter-s can offer to sell the commodity at prices below tIne market cost of acquir--ing it in the United States. These bids are comitingent upon receivimig the necessary subsidy from the USDA.
The foreign buyer-nnay accept bids made by nunnet-ous U.S. exporter-s.The U.S. exporters then bid against each other to receiye the USDA's sunplus stocks as a payment for the expont subsidy. During tlnis process, eacin expon-ter states hnow large a subsidy is required to make the export sale. For' example, if one expom'ter' r-equests a subsidy of $30 per torn amnd another r-equests $35 per ton for sale of the same commodity to the same countty, the USDA would award the subsidy payment to the lower bidder. Thus, the bid process helps the USDA get a larget-volume of exports per dollar of subsidy. if tine exporter's bid for the subsidy is successfrrh, tine commodity sale to the foreign country is made; otherwise, the sale to the for'eign country is voided. Upon pmoof of shipment and landirng of the connmoditv in the targeted rnnar-ket, the expor-ter is paid by the USDA with a genen-ic commodity cer-tificate in the amount of the bonus. The certificate can he exchanged for its value in any of the sur-plus stocks held by the USDA. The exclnange of certificates for' nnost commodities is nnade at tine "Posted County Price," which is r-epr-eserntative of an aver-age local mamket pnice. 'Fine exchnamnge of cen-tificates for-wheat is accornnplished through a uSDA auction. The EEP, as an export subsidy progr-amn, will iricn-ease the quantity of exports by driving down tine price of exports. As Belongia 11986) has noted, however-, expont r'evenues will not necessarily rise as tine quantity of expon-ts increases,':~If the world dennand for wheat is imnelastic, then the EEP would cause a r-eduction in export revenues. Ther-efor-e, tine price elasticity of export demarnd for U.S. wheat is a crucial variable for determining the overall effects of the EEP.
Estimates of the price elasticity of export dennand for-U.S. wineat cover a wide rannge of values. Gardiner and Dixit 11987) sunnmarized studies over the past two decades that estinnated tinis elasticity.
"The variable levy taxes imports at the rate of the difference between the world price and the EC threshold price. For example, in March 1987, the EC threshold price for wheat was $8.53
per bushel while the world price was $1.95 per bushel, Importers would have been required to pay a levy of $6.58 ($8.53 -$1.95). These payments represented a large income source for the EC when it was a major importer. "The EEP is only one device that the United States allegedly has used to influence the EC. The Farm Bill of 1985 sharply cut the crop loan rate which allowed the market price to plunge while maintaining a high level of income support for farmers.
This cut in market prices led to higher export subsidy costs for the EC. in addition, the 1985 Farm Bill introduced the practice of marketing loans for cotton and rice, The marketing loans also led to lower world prices while maintaining farmers' income. Cotton and rice, however, are not exported in any signif icant quantities by the EC.
"See Belongia (1986) for a discussion of the profitability of farming and the pitfalls of using export volume as an indicator of the farm sector's economic health,
The shot-n-run that is, one year or less) pt-ice elasticity ranged fronn -0.14 to -3.13 with an average of -0.72, wlnile the long-nun that is, mon-c than one year-) price elasticity ranged fl-ow -023 to -6.72 with an average of -1.93. The lack of a consensus estinnate pnecludes a definitive assessment about the desin-abilitv of EEP; however-, some suggestive evidence can he assembled, Witln 14 of the 17 estimates of the shor-t-run pr-ice elasticity in the inelastic range, evidence suggests that irncr-easimig export subsidies will dect-ease export revenues in the sinort-run. A onetinne, acr-oss-the-hoard subsidy is clearly unwarr-anted irn this case."
If tIne export subsidy continues, then the longrun price elasticity is r-elevant. A definitive conclusion is no longer' possible. The studies suggest that the long-run price elasticity is likely to be elastic. If so, then export r-evenues will increase in the longn-un due to the expont subsidies. With export revenues likely decreasing in the shon-t-r-un and incteasing in the long-run, additional imnfornnation about the magnitudes of the export revenues and subsidy costs over time amid the appropriate discount rate is required befor-e a definitive conclusion can be reached.
In fact, information requirements are even
greater. An implicit assumption of the elasticit discussion is that the EC, as well as other countries, do not attempt to counter-act the EEP. The parallel rise in U.S. and EC export subsidies, as well as anecdotal evidence presented later, reveals this assumption is not appropriate. in addition, the EEP is targeted to specific markets where U.S. exports have been displaced by the EC. Thus, information is required about the price elasticity of export demand for specific markets. Consensus estimates concerning specific matkets are simply not available. Finally, other factors that influence the level of U.S. wheat exports must be accounted for.
Despite tine difficulty of estimating EEP's effect on export r-evenues, the EEP clearly has boosted tine volume of wheat exports by eliminating the EC's export price advantage. Since 1985, the U.S. expont pr-ice has been 530-540 per ton higher-than the subsidized EC export price, a difference offset by the aver-age EEP subsidy of approximately $33. The effect of this subsidy, along with four-otherfactors that influenced U.S. wheat exports over the past three years, were analyzed by Bailey )1988b, These other-factor-s were the lower price suppont loan rates for-wheat, reductions in the yields of connpeting exporters, increased imports by the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China not attributable to the EEP and finally the lower value of the dollar-. Other-factors that influence wheat exports, such as world economic health and production in innpor-ting countries, were not evaluated. Bailey found that the EEP was respornsible for about one-third of the increase in wheat exports from 1985 to 1987 attt-ibutable to the five factors." The EEP was responsible for roughly a 305 million bushel increase in wheat exports over 1986/87 and 1987/88. Over-this same period, the cost of the EEP subsidy given to exporters for wheat sales was approximately $1.24 billion.# These estimates translate to an approximate cost of $4.08 for every bushel of increased exports. The average U.S. Gulf export price for wheat over these two years was only $3.16. tn terms of its primary goal, the EEP incr-eased exports, but it did so at a high cost in the short-run. Destroying the goveroment-owned stocks, which entails an opportunity cost of approximately $3.16 per bushel, would be a more cost-effective form of sun-plus rennoval than the EEP with a cost of $4.08 per bushel. ' ' 4 Using a model of international wheat markets, Sharples (1984) simulated the 1983 effects of an across~the-board$34 per ton ($93/bushel) U.S. subsidy on its wheat exports. A specific goal was to compare the costs of using export subsidies to reduce surplus stocks with using the payment-in-kind acreagereduction program. Assuming the EC counter-subsidized to maintain its existing volume of wheat exports, the U.S. subsidy would have caused a 300 million bushel increase in U.S. exports, which represents a 20 percent increase above the level of unsubsidized exports. The direct budget cost would have totaled $1.6 billion or approximately $5.30 for each additional bushel of wheat exported. A less costly alternative would have been for the government to buy the additional 300 million bushels at the existing $3.65 loan rate and then destroy it. "The lower foreign-exchange value of the dollar, which might be expected to have price effects similar to an across-the-board subsidy, accounted for little of the increase in wheat exports.
and 1987/88 was estimated because year by year cost data were not available, The share of total EEP wheat sales (through August 4, 1988) made in the two years was approximately 85 percent. The total market value of the wheat subsidies given to exporters through August 4, 1988 was $1.46 billion, The two-year cost of wheat subsidies therefore was estimated at $1.24 billion ($1.46 billion times 85 percent).
"The availability of surplus commodities is another important factor in the EEP which became apparent in the drought year of 1988. When government stocks of wheat are depleted by drought or by other factors, the EEP program would be forced to reduce its activity. Such irregularity makes the program less reliable from the perspective of importing countries, The reaction of importers likely would be to diversify sources and reduce reliance on a single export source. In addition, the changes in the EEP possibly prevent the full impact of the rising exports from the higher price elasticities of demand in the long run from occurring.
"The cost of the wheat subsidy for the two crop years 1986/87
EEP and the Goal of Liberalizing Agriculture Worldwide
In addition to incr-easing exports, the EEP is being used to pr-essur-e the EC to hbetalize its agnicultural pr-oduction and trade policies. By increasing the costs of the EC's agricultunal suppon-t programs, the United States hopes to induce the Eur-opean Community to negotiate major reductions in these programs." The political natur-e of the agricultural prngrams of both the United States and the European Community preclude any definitive conclusions about the response of tine EC to the EEP in the long run; however-, insights from strategic trade theory and the observed initial EC responses that are identified below suggest the EEP has been ineffective."
In a strategic environment, a small number-of economic agents make interdependent decisions." A decision by one agent can alter the costs and benefits facing another-agent. Thus, agents attempt to judge the response of their rivals before determining the best cour-se of action. Contrary to a worid of perfect competition with many agents each too small to influence the market outcome, agricultural trade policy can be viewed as a strategic environment that can be altered by gover-nmental decisions. Obviously, the United States and the EC are major decisionmakers in this environment.
Subsidies play an important role in strategic trade policy. Export subsidies have been recommended for strategic industries that are expected to earn additional returns sufficient to exceed the total cost of the subsidy. Strategic tnade policy is controver-sial for-a number of reasons, one of which is that strategic trade policy tends to create an adversarial situation between countries. One of the major problems of the EEP in liberalizing agricultur-e is that mixed signals are being sent to the EC and other agricultural nations. The U.S. proposals ar-c a highly publicized initiative to stimulate a cooperative search to r-efon-m agriculture through GATI. At the same time, the retaliaton' challenges to European-subsidized export sales can be termed "non-cooperative activisnn." Tanger-mann 119851 argues that the U.S. expor't subsidies will be coutnterproductive in achieving a reduction of EC agricultural subsidies. His r-easons are both politically and economically based. First, the EC's costs of matching the U.S. subsidies are relatively small. If U.S. subsidies had reduced world grain prices by 10 per-cent in 1982, the EC "The rising costs of the EC's agricultural programs have already lead to some reductions in price supports. In 1984, the EC imposed dairy quotas and began charging farmers who exceeded their quotas. More recently, the EC has staled its willingness to reduce grain support prices if grain production exceeds 160 million metric tons, The relationship of these cuts to the EEP, however, is unknown. "Strategic trade theory has become popular because of recent developments that have focused on the importance of economies of scale, production experience and technological change as determinants of trade patterns. These determinants raise the possibility that productive resources such as labor and capital can earn higher returns in some industries than others and that certain sectors generate benefits that accrue to other sectors. Both possibilities can be used to justify an activist use and increase income domestically. Strategic trade theory combines international trade theory and political theory to explain the dynamics of trade policies and assist in designing policies that are in a nation's best interest, "See Richardson (1986) for a more lengthy discussion of strategic trade policy.
"Subsidies for research and development have been recommended for strategic industries whose competitive positions depend on generating technological advances, In addition to creating an adversarial situation between countries, there are concerns that special interest groups will capture the benefits from the subsidies at the expense of the nation, of trade policies to influence domestic as well as foreign activity could lnave maintained its export volume by am irncrease inn its agricultural budget of only 0.8 percernt. Second, since tine Urnited States can be portrayed as tine enemy, there will be nnuch political support for-expendittmnes to counter-act tine U.S. subsidies,
